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The question "do sanctions work?" can be interpreted not only as a
political or legal assessment about their effects on a State, but also as an
analysis of whether sanctions are designed, managed and enforced in a
manner which makes them viable for an extended period of time for those
who are required to implement them. Recent practice denies the once
popular argument that United Nations' sanctions could be a quick tool
giving an immediate devastating blow to the economy of the target State.
Instead, and especially when they aim at achieving deep policy changes,
sanctions are slow to be fully put in place, slow to work, and slow to
clearly show their effects, even when they are imposed against extremely
vulnerable states such as Haiti. The question whether sanctions work has
also to be seen in light of the lack of a widely shared understanding within
the Security Council about the purpose and acceptable scope and duration
of sanctions, which is reflected in the vague goals and formulation of most
current sanctions regimes. While scholarly debates concentrate on the
constitutional legitimacy of Security Council actions under the Charter, or
on their appropriateness and impact in specific cases, attention should also
be paid to some procedural aspects of the imposition, implementation,
management, and enforcement of sanctions. I will thus look at sanctions
from the perspective of the implementing States rather than their target. In
the absence of a consensus as to substantial reforms in the manner of using
economic sanctions, possible adjustments to make sanctions regimes more
"effective" should for the moment be configured within the existing legal
framework.
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II. DESIGN, FORMULATION, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
SANCTIONS
Sanctions are conceived and resolutions drafted in a hurried
political atmosphere, even though they sometimes remain "in the pipeline"
for a while, theoretically ensuring the time for a better conceptual and
legal quality of the final product. The extreme politicization of the whole
exercise does not militate in favour of good and clear drafting; moreover,
the Security Council has shown a considerable linguistic and conceptual
conservatism, relying over and over on the language of previous
resolutions even though their terms have proved to be imprecise. Thus,
the term "transshipment" used in paragraph 6 of resolution 757 (1992)
instituting sanctions against Yugoslavia, actually refers to both
transshipment and transit, and recurs in this partial sense in resolutions 787
(1992) and 820 (1993). Needless to say, this generated considerable
confusion. Again in resolution 757 (1992), paragraph 5 on financial
restriction, repeats verbatim the language of paragraph 4 of resolution 661
(1990) on Iraq, even though the latter had generated considerable
uncertainties in many States as to whether it contained an obligation to
freeze Iraqi assets abroad. The issue was clarified in paragraph 21 of
resolution 820 (1993), almost one year later, and only after substantial
pressure by the United States. In the case of Iraq, it was clarified in
resolution 670 (1990), adopted in October 1990.
The atmosphere in which sanctions are designed also does not
militate in favour of a good coordination between measures contained in
the same resolution or in different resolutions. Financial sanctions have
proven to be particularly problematic, both in scope and, in relation to
trade restrictions. The question whether a commercial transaction
authorized by the competent Sanctions Committee, or falling outside the
scope of the sanctions, automatically legitimates the unfreezing of funds or
financial transactions otherwise prohibited, has been a vexing one in the
Iraq, Libya, and Yugoslavia Sanctions Committees. The ambiguity of the
resolutions, and the lack of agreement within the Committees, weakens the
credibility of the various regimes and opens dangerous loopholes. This is
particularly evident in the case of Libya where resolutions 748 (1992) and
883 (1993) impose only a limited trade embargo but much wider financial
sanctions, including a clear obligation to freeze Libyan assets.
These are probably inevitable shortcomings in view of the way in
which the Council operates. However, when a certain provision has
proved particularly problematic or contains obvious oversights, a few
pragmatic corrective steps could be taken. All existing Sanctions
Committees are requested by their establishing resolutions to recommend
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to the Security Council possible improvements of the sanctions. The
Committees have largely neglected this function, but they might rather
easily exercise it, as explained below. On the basis of these
recommendations, the Council could proceed to authentic interpretations of
its previous decisions. Precedents of this nature already exist, for
example, the clarification contained in paragraph 10 of resolution 787
(1992), that the expression "Yugoslav vessels" had to be interpreted for
the purposes of the sanctions as including vessels flying the flag of a third
State but owned by Yugoslav interests. Also, in paragraph 9 of resolution
670 (1990), the Council confirmed that the financial restrictions against
Iraq imposed by resolution 661 (1990) included the freeze of Iraqi assets.
Such interpretations could be inserted in a resolution or given in the form
of statements made by the President of the Council on behalf of its
members.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
The implementation of sanctions by States is obviously the
backbone of the whole system. Sanctions resolutions, adopted under
Chapter VII of the Charter, are immediately and unconditionally
mandatory for all Member States, but their largely non-self-executing
nature makes their incorporation into the legal system of each State
necessary. The approach used by the Charter, as consistently upheld by
the Sanctions Committees, emphasizes the sovereign duty and right of each
State to give its own interpretation to the vague and often open-ended
terms of the resolutions. This, of course, together with the wide variety of
national legal mechanisms regulating trade control measures, does not
favour uniformity of application in the absence of an institutional
coordinating or assisting mechanism. Recent practice has underlined this
rather unorganized state of affairs. For example, the Council has included
in most current sanctions regimes a provision prohibiting claims by the
target State in connection with the non-implementation of contracts or
other transactions as a consequence of the sanctions (for example,
paragraph 29 of resolution 687 (1991) and paragraph 9 of resolution 757
(1992)). A typical example are performance bonds or similar bank
guarantees. The language used does not clarify whether such guarantees,
which are separate undertakings independent from the main contract, are
simply suspended until the lifting of the sanctions, or have become null
and void. Courts in several European countries have reached opposite
conclusions in this respect. These differences could be exploited by the
target State, which could engage in forum shopping in certain countries to
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obtain a judicial decision confirming indirectly the persistent validity of a
bank guarantee to its benefit.
Once again, this lack of uniformity is an inevitable result of the
Charter system and, indeed, of the attachment of States to the widest
possible preservation of their sovereign prerogatives. However, the
existing framework offers the possibility of feasible, if limited, corrective
steps which should be considered by the main supporters of the sanctions.
Any attempt to foster a greater uniformity in sanctions
implementation should be based on the reporting procedures established by
sanctions resolutions. Within the existing regimes, states are required to
report to the Council their implementation measures, normally in the
resolution initially imposing sanctions. Only one report is required; so far
there has been no provision for regular periodic reports. States are to
report within a short time-frame, normally a month, which is probably
meant to convey a sense of urgency and determination, but which does not
necessarily ensure accurate reporting. The reports have no fixed format
and vary widely, from vague statements of compliance with the sanctions
to detailed overviews of the relevant legislation. The Sanctions
Committees, with the initial partial exception of the Committee on Iraq
which sent a questionnaire to all states in early 1991, do not examine the
reports and do not entrust this task to the Secretariat, thus preventing the
establishment of an institutional memory and failing to exercise a
systematic scrutiny which could detect loopholes and deter possible
violations.
In order to build a more effective system, states should instead be
required by the Security Council to report on their domestic measures at
least once a year to the Sanctions Committee. They should be requested to
use a pre-established format to be indicated by the Committees, which
should focus on measures taken, legal problems encountered, patterns of
violations detected, and inter-state cooperation established. These reports
should then be considered by the Committees or one of their working
groups, in the course of formal meetings, on the basis of a preliminary
analysis carried out by the Secretariat. In exceptional cases, the reporting
states could be invited to provide clarifications during a meeting. On the
basis of their findings, the Committees could issue general comments
which, without mentioning individual States, would clarify the
interpretation of key provisions of the sanctions resolutions or highlight
common implementation problems. The Committees would also, if
appropriate, recommend to the Security Council the adoption of the
authentic interpretations mentioned above. This approach, which is close
to that employed by the Human Rights Committee, should not impose an
unacceptable burden on the Committees, as the number of countries
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entertaining meaningful economic relations with the target State would
probably be limited. At the same time, it would go a long way towards
making more rational and uniform the implementation of sanctions, and
strengthening the credibility of the institutional machinery of the United
Nations as a source of assistance and support.
Another practical proposal would be the elaboration of a model
law for the implementation of multilateral sanctions or, if this is too
far-reaching at this time, of a set of minimum implementation requirements
to be issued in the form of a legal guide. The Security Council and its
subsidiary organs would not be suitable bodies for such an exercise. A
natural candidate for the task would rather be the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), a subsidiary body
of the General Assembly, whose goal is precisely the uniformity of trade
law and which is a genuinely technical body with substantial expertise.
This would, incidentally, ensure a more active participation of the general
Assembly in the general management of sanctions.
IV. MANAGEMENT
The Security Council customarily establishes a partially centralized
management of the sanctions, centered in the Sanctions Committees. The
Committees are subsidiary bodies of the Council, and their membership is
the same as that of the Council at any given time; they take all decisions
by consensus and always meet in closed sessions. Their documentation is
of restricted circulation, thus their decisions are normally not released to
the United Nations membership at large. The Committees have been the
object of much criticism during the last few years, due to their secrecy,
politicization, lack of consistent criteria and penchant for heavy
micro-management. The Sanctions Committees are indeed political (and
politicized) organs, which discharge their mandate under the influence of
their most powerful members and their bilateral policies toward the target
State. As a result, they are not particularly well-suited for promoting and
ensuring a consistent and rational management of the functions falling
within their mandates.
I will limit myself to a few observations on issues that have a
particular impact on the "effectiveness" of existing sanctions. A first
observation is that there is a substantial discrepancy between the mandate
of the Committees on paper and in practice. A reading of the various
resolutions clearly shows that some of the functions provided therein, such
as those mentioned above concerning recommendations to the Council for
the improvement of the sanctions, are practically not carried out. The
actual activities of the Committees can be grouped in three categories:
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investigation of possible violations; regulation of exceptions to the
sanctions (normally those concerning "humanitarian" situations); and
advice, normally on a case-by-case basis, on the scope of certain
provisions.
The latter category has no explicit basis in any sanctions
resolution. This would not be a matter of great concern per se; reliance on
a reasonable interpretation of the implied powers of the Committees, as
well as the acquiescence of the Council and the whole United Nations
membership, constitute a sufficient legal basis for the legitimacy of this
function. However, on the one hand, the Committees have occasionally
given general interpretations of the terms of the resolutions, for example,
with regards to the conditions for allowing Yugoslav athletes to participate
in sporting events. On the other hand, in several important cases, the
Committees have gone beyond a purely advisory role and have couched
their decisions in terms granting or denying approval for certain actions or
transactions. In the latter case, this function is of a rather regulatory
nature, but it sometimes concerns issues for which the resolutions do not
foresee any regulatory role for the Committee. Even though, to my
knowledge, no State has claimed that the Committees act ultra vires in this
respect, it would still be important for the long-term viability of sanctions
that the actual functions of the Committees be spelled out in clearer and
more specific terms in the enabling resolutions.
The approval of "humanitarian" and other transactions has raised
much criticism for the slowness of the Committees' procedure; its apparent
lack of sensitivity for the exceptional gravity of certain humanitarian
situations; its tendency to micro-manage in a way that has impaired
legitimate trade flows; and its refusal to indicate in a general and consistent
way what kind of situations and products will be considered under the
humanitarian exceptions. The latter approach obviously makes the
approval pattern of the Committees somehow erratic. The performance of
the Committee on Yugoslavia has admittedly improved, also as a result of
the strong criticism just mentioned, but much remains to be done. The
elaboration of general approval criteria, in particular, has proved
particularly difficult.
Even though there are clear limits to a "rationalization" of the
approach used by the Committees, an improvement of a general nature
which would go a long way in making their role and functions more
acceptable, relates to their accountability and transparency. Under the
latter respect, the Council has recently taken some welcome, if limited,
steps, providing for example for the issuing of press releases by the
Committees and the distribution of the list of approvals of humanitarian
transactions to permanent missions that so request. However, the Council
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and the Committees should seriously consider publishing at least a
summary of their most important decisions, as well as figures and statistics
concerning their work. The proposal made above concerning general
interpretive comments should be seen in this context. Moreover, since in a
paper-based organization such as the United Nations, reporting is the main
instrument to ensure accountability, the reporting requirements for the
Committees should be clarified and strengthened. It is unacceptable that
the Committees almost never report to the Security Council, and the latter
does not report to the General Assembly on their activities. This state of
affairs worsens the already existing imbalance within the Organization
between the two major policy-making organs. A serious display of
commitment and self-restraint in this direction by the Council would make
the management of the sanctions more transparent, acceptable, and viable
in the long term.
V. MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT
Also in this case, the United Nations system is based on the
sovereignty of each of its Members; which have the duty to adopt the
necessary measures for the supervision and enforcement of the sanctions
within their jurisdiction. There is a lack of institutional machinery for
cooperation and coordination in this regard. The Sanctions Committees
are supposed to be the main institutional watchdogs, relying on
information provided to them or reported in the media in order to discover
and publicize violations. However, the reliance on the sovereign good
faith of States acts as a limit to the effectiveness of this function. The
Committees have to follow a rather slow and cumbersome diplomatic
procedure, which often stops in front of the denial by a state of any
wrongdoing. As a result, in the case of Yugoslavia, the violations
reported to the Security Council have been a trickle, in strident contrast
with the large number reported in the media. This weakens the credibility
of the sanctions, and consequently the level of actual commitment by many
States.
The inherent weakness of the United Nations' role in monitoring
and enforcement, and the evident need to go beyond absolute reliance on
individual compliance by States, explains the proliferation of forms of
naval enforcement authorized by the Security Council.' It is worth
recalling the interesting discussions about the Charter basis for the naval
quarantine established against Iraq; such discussions have not generated a
real consensus among scholars, but, in the meantime, the formula used in
1. For example, in resolution 665 (1990) for Iraq; resolution 787 (1992) for Yugoslavia;
and resolution 875 (1993) for Haiti.
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the Gulf has developed into a legally more coherent instrument. The
Multinational Interception Force operating in the Gulf under United States
command had no clear connection with, or reporting obligation to, the
United Nations; the forces operating in the Adriatic were, instead, under
the aegis of regional organizations (NATO and WEU), acting within
Chapter VIII of the Charter and reporting regularly to the Sanctions
Committees. This is a welcome development, as it makes enforcement
activities more transparent and complementary to the monitoring role of
the Committees.
However, "hard" enforcement by itself can be an unpopular and
non-viable option in the long term, among other reasons for its high costs,
the concerns raised by a foreign military presence, and open questions
about liability for expenses and damages caused by the interception of
innocent ships. The Council, or regional organizations supporting a
particular sanctions regime, should thus consider the establishment of
forms of "soft" monitoring and enforcement, focusing more on assistance
to implementing States than on coercive measures. Whereas this is totally
lacking in the case of Iraq, a very developed and interesting example
regards the sanctions against Yugoslavia. The European Union and the
OSCE deployed a number of Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs) in
countries neighbouring Yugoslavia, on the basis of bilateral agreements
with the latter. These Missions were staffed with customs officers who
assisted the local customs in complying with the sanctions, detecting
violation, and managing the traffic in goods authorized by the Sanctions
Committee. They reported to, and were coordinated by, a communication
centre (SAMCOMM) based in the European Community Commission in
Brussels, which liased with the Committee, regional organizations, and
humanitarian agencies. The high level of expertise, and the sophisticated
equipment supplied, allowed SAMs and SAMCOMM to exchange
information in real time and to assess with a high degree of accuracy the
absolute impact of sanctions. The installation of computer links, and the
secondment of liaison officers to the Sanctions Committee, ensured the
possibility of a full participation by the United Nations side. The presence
of customs officers from virtually all Western countries provided local
authorities with invaluable technical assistance, and constituted a strong
deterrent against a weak implementation of the sanctions. Thanks to the
presence of the SAMs, but with the exception of Albania and Macedonia,
the number of violations has been extremely low, thus maximizing the
impact of the sanctions on Yugoslavia. Finally, the establishment of a
reliable monitoring mechanism on the Danube has been vital for




Interestingly enough, this exercise has taken place entirely outside
the legal framework established by the Security Council, which limits itself
to encouraging regional efforts and cooperation. Moreover, the Sanctions
Committee has shown reluctance in following the recommendations and
technical advice from the SAMs and SAMCOMM, and even more, in
delegating some of the micro-management to them. It has taken more than
a year to convince the Committee to relax the restrictions on traffic on the
Danube, and to entrust the SAMs with the monitoring of non--strategic
goods passing through Serbian waters. Once again, the political "instinct"
to preserve as much authority as possible, and not to commit oneself to a
particular course of action, clashes with considerations of rational
management of sanctions or the need to minimize the inconveniences to
third, particularly front-line, States. Still, the presence of the SAMs and
the technical input of SAMCOMM has inevitably shaped and somehow
rationalized the work of the Committee, as compared to that of the
Committee on Iraq. The form of regional involvement just described
constitutes a very important precedent, and should be considered again for
future sanctions regimes. Certainly, the imposition of sanctions within the
European context, which brought forth the deep involvement of NATO,
EU and OSCE, may not recur easily. However, the EU or OSCE, whose
members have been quite frequently the direct initiators of sanctions
regimes in recent times, could offer the same kind of assistance to States
outside Europe, as a form of technical cooperation in the enforcement of
collective security measures. Its soft features, which would avoid Chapter
VII actions, together with the financial and political leverage of the
offering states, would make this formula potentially appealing and
promising for the success of sanctions programmes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
United Nations sanctions have been described as a blunt and rough
instrument, producing much collateral damage and showing few results in
the short term. It is important that the overall design and management of
the sanctions not be equally "blunt", that it could decrease their negative
impact for blind States as well as companies and international
organizations, obliged to give them effect. It would be highly desirable if
the international community could agree on a more rational and strategic
use of this instrument. However, since this result is quite unlikely in the
short term, the Security Council could and should consider a number of
rather pragmatic and feasible improvements within the existing regimes,
which would substantially enhance both the implementation and the image
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of United Nations sanctions. I have tried through this contribution to
highlight a few of them.
